تحلیل اثرات سیاستگذاری اقتصاد گیگ بر رفاه و نابرابری درآمدی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشیار اقتصاد، گروه آموزشی مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم انسانی واجتماعی، دانشگاه گلستان، گرگان

10.22034/jstp.2025.11981.1890

چکیده

اقتصاد گیگ به‌عنوان یکی از بروندادهای ساختاری اقتصاد دیجیتال، چالشی نوظهور در مسیر طراحی سیاست‌های رفاه اجتماعی و تنظیم بازارکار به‌شمار می‌آید. این مقاله، با بهره‌گیری از یک مدل شبیه‌سازی عامل‌محور، به ارزیابی پیامدهای چهار سناریوی سیاستی شامل «بیمه تأمین اجتماعی»، «بیمه بیکاری»، «برنامه‌های آموزش مهارتی» و «ترکیب هم‌زمان سیاست­ها» در بستر اقتصاد ایران می‌پردازد. تحلیل نتایج شبیه‌سازی نشان می‌دهد اجرای سیاست‌های مجزای بیمه‌ای در غیاب سیاست‌های توانمندساز آموزشی، اثربخشی محدودی در ارتقاء رفاه داشته و حتی در برخی موارد موجب افزایش بیکاری یا کاهش مشارکت در بازار کار شده‌اند. از سوی دیگر، سیاست آموزش مهارتی علیرغم تأثیر مثبت بر رشد اقتصادی و اشتغال، سبب تشدید شاخص‌های فقر و افزایش نابرابری درآمد شده است. تحلیل‌های حساسیت مدل، حاکی از آن است که حداکثرسازی رفاه اجتماعی، مستلزم تنظیم بهینه همزمان نرخ بیمه، سطح مزایای بیکاری، کیفیت آموزش و دستمزدهای پلتفرمی است. نتایج نشان داد که ترکیب بیمه‌های اجتماعی با آموزش مهارتی، بیشترین تأثیر مثبت را بر رفاه اجتماعی و کاهش نرخ بیکاری دارد. همچنین، تنظیم دستمزدها در سطح بهینه (۱.۳۷ برابر حداقل دستمزد) و محدود کردن سهم مشاغل گیگ به ۱۰-۲۰% از کل اشتغال، به بهبود تعادل بازارکار کمک می‌کند. بر این اساس، این پژوهش بر ضرورت طراحی سیاست‌های تلفیقی و چندسطحی به‌منظور توسعه اقتصاد گیگ در جهت تحقق عدالت اجتماعی و کارایی اقتصادی تأکید می‌ورزد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Analyzing the Effects of Gig Economy Policymaking on Welfare and Income Inequality

نویسنده [English]

  • Hassan Daliri
Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Management and Economics, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Golestan University, Gorgan, Iran. H.daliri@gu.ac.ir
چکیده [English]

The gig economy, as one of the structural manifestations of the digital economy, presents an emerging challenge in designing social welfare policies and labor market regulations. This study employs an agent-based simulation model to evaluate the impacts of four policy scenarios—"social insurance," "unemployment insurance," "skills training programs," and "simultaneous policy combinations"—within the context of Iran's economy. Simulation results reveal that policy implementation can yield contradictory effects on core welfare and inequality metrics. Isolated insurance policies, when decoupled from enabling measures, demonstrate limited efficacy in enhancing welfare and may even increase unemployment or reduce labor market participation in some cases. Conversely, while skills training policies positively influence economic growth and employment, they generate unequal benefit distribution, exacerbating poverty and Gini indices. Sensitivity analyses indicate that social welfare maximization requires simultaneous optimization of insurance rates, unemployment benefit levels, training quality, and platform wages. Key findings demonstrate that integrating social insurance with skills training yields the most significant positive impact on social welfare and unemployment reduction. Additionally, calibrating wages at an optimal threshold (1.37 times the minimum wage) and capping gig employment at 10-20% of total labor participation improves market equilibrium. The study concludes by emphasizing the necessity for integrated, multi-tiered, and interaction-sensitive policy frameworks to steer gig economy development toward both social equity and economic efficiency. This approach addresses the inherent tensions between labor market flexibility and worker protection in digital platform ecosystems.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Gig economy
  • economic walfare
  • inequality
  • unemployment insurance
  • skills training programs
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