Mechanisms of Hidden Monopoly in Iran’s Digital Platforms: Rethinking Digital Economy Policymaking

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Ph.D student of Entrepreneurship, Department of Technology, Faculty of Entrepreneurship, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 Assistant Professor, Department of New Venture Creation, Faculty of Entrepreneurship, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

10.22034/jstp.2025.12004.1906

Abstract

 This study aims to identify and explain the mechanisms of "hidden monopoly" in Iranian digital platforms. A phenomenon that emerges not through overt dominance but through gradual, multilayered, and interaction-driven actions. Using a qualitative approach and conducting 18 semi-structured interviews with experts in the on-demand delivery digital platform industry, data were analyzed using thematic analysis. The findings indicate that the hidden monopoly results from the cyclical interplay of three levels of platform actions: (1) at the level where the platform acts as an active agent, shaping user choices through market architecture and design; (2) at the level where the platform, as a hidden controller, directs the daily interactions of users and partners; and (3) at the level where, as a passive leveraging, it exploits regulatory gaps or institutional voids to consolidate its position. These levels not only operate independently but also interact dynamically to form a cyclical structure of invisible power in which platforms undermine competition without overtly violating antitrust regulations. The innovation of this research lies in the analytical conceptualization of the hidden monopoly phenomenon from the perspective of platform positional agency, articulated through three interrelated roles: active, controlling, and leveraging. Theoretically, the paper proposes an integrated and multilevel model for analyzing platform power, and practically, it provides a basis for rethinking digital economy policymaking in Iran.

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