بازی پویا میان نهادهای علم و فناوری

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار اقتصاد دانشگاه قم

2 دانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد اسلامی دانشگاه قم

چکیده

نهادهای علم ‌و فناوری به عنوان پیشران علم، دانش، صنعت و بازار همواره نقشی اساسی در نظام نوآوری بازی می‌کنند. به طور کلی می‌توان سه نوع از چنین‌ نهادهایی را به رسمیت شناخت: نهاد علم شامل دانشگاه‌ها و سایر مؤسسات آموزش عالی؛ نهاد فناوری همچون پارک‌های علم و فناوری، واحدهای تحقیق‌وتوسعه، مراکز تحقیقاتی و شرکت‌های دانش‌بنیان و نهایتاً نهاد بازار به معنای گسترده خود که دربردارنده بخش‌های صنایع، خدمات و کشاورزی است. از این رو، چگونگی ارتباط مؤثر، کارآمد و متعادل بین این سه نهاد می‌تواند در حکمرانی و سیاست‌گذاری علم و فناوری اثربخش باشد. در این مقاله سعی شده هر یک از سه نهاد فوق را مستقل از یکدیگر در نظر گرفته، راهبرد‌های پیش روی هر یک را مبتنی بر ترجیحات مشارکت یا عدم مشارکت احصاء و از طریق بازی‌های پویا با اطلاعات کامل کنش‌های تعاملی، تجزیه و تحلیل کنیم. برای حل این بازی از روش تعادل کامل بازی‌های فرعی (SPE) استفاده شده و در آن حالت‌های انجام کنش، راهبرد‌های پیش رو، پیامد هر راهبرد، تعادل‌های نش و تعادل بازی‌های فرعی و کل بازی، از طریق فرم گسترده و فرم ماتریسی نیز ارائه شده است. تعادل حاصل از این بازی نشان می‌دهد که علی‌رغم وجود چندین تعادل نش در این بازی، تنها یک تعادل نش شامل مشارکت سه‌گانه هر سه نهاد به عنوان تعادل نهایی و بهینه قابل مشاهده است.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Dynamic Game between Science and Technology Institutions

نویسندگان [English]

  • Omid Ali Adeli 1
  • Hamidreza Maghsoudi 1
  • Ali Saeedi 1
  • Hossein Bahrami 2
1 Faculty Member, Department Economics & Management, Qom University, Iran
2 Ph.D. in Islamic Economics, Qom University, Iran
چکیده [English]

Institutions of science and technology system, as drivers of science, knowledge, industry and the market, always play a key role in Innovation Systems. Generally, three kinds of such institutions can be recognized: (i) Institution of science including universities and other higher-education institutions; (ii) Institution of technology such as science and technology parks, R&D units, research centers and knowledge-based enterprises; (iii) Institution of market in its wide meaning including industries, services and agriculture sectors. Considering each of these three institutions independently, we have analyzed their strategies based on the preferences of cooperating or non-cooperating through dynamic games with complete information. In order to solve this game, we have used the method of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). As a result, we have shown modes of action, leading strategies, outcome of each strategy, Nash equilibria as well as sub-game equilibrium. Whole game is also shown in its extended and matrix form. Among several Nash equilibria, only one equilibrium was credible according SPE which is triple partnership between all institutions.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Innovation system
  • Triple Helix
  • Science and Technology Institutions
  • Dynamic Games with Complete Information
  • SPE Sub-Game Equilibrium
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